In less than a month, Nicolás Maduro will begin a third term as president of Venezueladespite the fact that the vote count shows that the opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez won the elections by a large majority. Although the entire international community has an important role in holding Maduro and his elite accountable and supporting the Venezuelan people, all eyes point to one country: the United States.
The return of Donald Trump to the presidency has triggered expectations of a return to “maximum pressure” strategy of his first term. On the contrary, many recent comments warned about the serious consequences of a return to that policysuggesting instead a continuation of the sanctions easing measures adopted under the Biden administration.
But neither the return to 2019 nor the normalization of relations with Maduro will create favorable conditions for a democratic transformation in Venezuela, especially given the strong grassroots movement that came together to support González. New circumstances demand a new strategy.
How did we get here? By December 2023, Maduro had obtained important concessions from the US. Among them, the granting of licenses to Chevron by OFAC, another license that temporarily excluded the state oil company PDVSA and the pardon to Alex Saabthe brain of Maduro’s kleptocracy. For its part, the opposition received only vague promises.
Maduro hoped to encourage a divided opposition to boycott the July elections, so he could achieve an electoral victory acceptable enough to restore his international standing and ensure the lifting of sanctions. But he overestimated his political support and ignored the opposition’s ability to establish a solid Edmundo González candidacy. What happened next was a chain of improvisations and exaggerated reactions. Once the true will of the voters was discovered, Maduro ordered his electoral authority to proclaim him president-elect without official scrutiny or transparent results.
What to do now? In 2022, the US Treasury Department justified its decision to license Chevron based on “specific actions that alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan people and promote the restoration of democracy.” But in 2023 he warned: “The Treasury is prepared to modify or revoke the authorizations at any time, if Maduro’s representatives do not fulfill their commitments.” We should not doubt the sincerity of these statements; The oil licenses were granted not because sanctions failed, but because sanctions were considered the best incentive for negotiations. Therefore, the licenses could be reversed if Maduro violates the commitments.
Since Maduro violated every line of the 2021 Memorandum of Understanding and of Barbados Agreement of 2023the US government should keep its promise modifying or revoking oil licenses. Some, however, argue in favor of ignoring those statements and changing strategy, granting oil licenses based on specific actions to restore democracy and provide stable cash flow to Maduro, who should be treated as president.
But maintaining the easing of sanctions, even though Maduro has abandoned any attempt to even simulate actions to restore democracy, would weaken the credibility of US policy. This, in turn, would eliminate any possibility of relying on those policies as leverage to encourage a negotiated solution.
Another argument proposes that continuing Easing oil sanctions would benefit Venezuela and reduce migratory flows. Others suggest maintaining oil licenses because they have brought transparency to the oil industry.
The evidence indicates that these are wrong proposals. Oil production permitted by OFAC licenses lacks the institutional framework necessary to efficiently distribute oil revenues for the well-being of Venezuelans. In fact, this oil production operates under the Venezuela Anti-Blockade Lawwhich hinders transparency and accountability while promoting predatory policies such as corruption and human rights violations.
More oil will not deter migratory flows because oil revenues cannot be distributed transparently and efficiently. Under the opacity rule imposed by the Anti-Blockade Law, oil revenues will fuel predatory policies, as demonstrated by Maduro’s recent attack on the booming shrimp industry.
OFAC licenses do not address the root cause of the migration crisiswhich is the significant political decomposition. This decline will likely continue under Maduro’s self-proclamation and the Anti-Blockade Law, increasing pressures on migratory flows.
Standardization policy is based on a misconception: the belief that sanctions should be lifted because they “failed” to promote democracy. The same fallacy can be used to conclude that since easing policies “failed” to achieve free and fair elections, the only option is to return to the 2019 strategy.
The 2019 US approach to Venezuela faced two main problems: It lacked a grassroots movement and offered no convincing strategy to encourage ruling elites to favor a transition. The latter issue was addressed with the 2020 “Framework for a Peaceful Democratic Transition in Venezuela,” which ended the so-called “maximum pressure” policy. And now, unlike 2019, Venezuela has a grassroots movement fueled by the 2023 primaries and galvanized by the July 28 elections.
The recent project of Bolivar Law approved by the United States House of Representatives and the numerous statements by the US government recognizing González as president-elect are signs that the Bipartisan politics could sharpen the focus on Venezuela’s current conditions. The alternative to maximum pressure and sanctions relaxation policy alike should be based on three fundamental pillars.
The first pillar is respect the will of Venezuelan voters recognizing Edmundo González as its elected president. The July 28 elections were in part the result of American support for the Barbados Agreement. Maduro’s elite has chosen to ignore this agreement, but the United States should continue to defend it following the Bogotá Declaration of 2023. Honoring González’s victory will help maintain the grassroots movement promoted by the primaries and elections.
The second pillar should be prevent Maduro from benefiting from oil licenses. Instead of paying Maduro his share of oil production, oil companies could deposit that share into an escrow account that could, over time, be used to fund humanitarian aid through transparent mechanisms.
Finally, the third pillar should be a comprehensive plan that uses personal and economic sanctions to support a democratic transition. This would incentivize members of the ruling elite to disobey Maduro and pursue political change. Increasing the cost of repression without alleviating the price of dissent will not promote democratic change.
Ignoring Maduro’s predatory nature and pretending that his government can behave rationally to promote the well-being of the people is a serious distortion of the facts. Normalization will only strengthen the ruling eliteswill endanger human rights and create conditions that drive migratory flows. The best alternative to the policy of relaxation is not to return to 2019, but to move forward in response to current conditions, honoring the results of the presidential elections while creating real incentives for democratic transformation.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Hernández is a professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the UCV and the UCAB of Venezuela. He is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, and directs public debt research at Aurora Macro Strategies. He was Special Attorney General of Venezuela.
