At dawn on November 21, Russian missiles hit the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro. Some were cruise missiles Kh-101carried by huge Russian bombers. Others were ballistic missiles Kinzhalfired from Russian planes. And at least one was new and nameless. The videos showed six warheads descending, almost vertically, over the city, each releasing a burst of smaller projectiles. What was this mysterious weapon?
The Ukrainian air force suggested it was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). These are almost exclusively associated with nuclear weapons and have never been fired in anger. Other observers pointed out the RS-26, a missile that is on the border between intermediate range (approximately between 3,000 km and 5,500 km) and intercontinental range (more than 5,500 km). Western officials hinted that the missile was an experimental prototype.
Later that day, Vladimir PutinRussia’s president, speaking from his wood-paneled office in the Kremlin, declared that this was in fact a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile known as Oreshnik. The missile, which hit a Ukrainian military production facility, was fired in response to Ukraine’s use of missiles ATACMS Americans and Storm Shadow British on Russian soil days earlier, Putin said. He added that it was traveling at more than ten times the speed of sound and could not be intercepted.
Putin’s claims should be taken with a grain of salt. In the past it has made lurid boasts of hypersonic missiles, sometimes exaggerating their capabilities. own Oreshnik It was “based” on the RS-26, a missile first tested 13 years ago, said Sabrina Singh, Pentagon deputy press secretary. It wasn’t any kind of revolutionary new weapon. However, the attack looks very much like part of a broader Russian effort to deter Western countries from deepening their involvement in Ukraine. An important audience was surely the incoming Trump administration, which is still fine-tuning its strategy for war.
On November 19, Russia published a revised nuclear doctrine that further explained (and in some cases expanded) the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used. The new doctrine specifies that major conventional attacks against Russia or allies such as Belarus could be met with a nuclear response. It also says that attacks by non-nuclear states (such as Ukraine) backed by nuclear states (such as the United States and Britain) could be treated as a joint attack. The Nov. 21 attack was almost certainly intended to amplify that nuclear signaling.
Russia has fired huge numbers of ballistic missiles at Ukraine in the past, many of them nuclear-capable, such as the Kinzhal. But Oreshnik is different. Originally, both United States as Russia They classified it as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Even if it is one level below their range, these intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles are complex and expensive weapons that are almost always associated with nuclear payloads. Only Iran has fired conventional missiles in anger. Furthermore, those carrying multiple warheads, such as the Oreshnik, are exclusively associated with nuclear weapons.
The Nov. 21 attack appeared to involve inert or dummy warheads, which have significant kinetic energy due to their speed, but not explosives. That is an indication that the missile was designed for nuclear and unconventional use. It is also noteworthy that Russia warned the United States 30 minutes in advance of the attack using communication channels designed for nuclear risk reduction, although the United States was clearly aware of some type of imminent threat the day before, as there were closed its embassy.
Simply put, Putin wants Ukraine and its Western allies to believe he could escalate either “vertically” within Ukraine or “horizontally,” attacking NATO states directly. “We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons,” he said on November 21, as he described Oreshnik, “against the military installations of those countries that allow their weapons to be used against our installations.” On the same day, Ukrainian lawmakers were warned that the country’s parliament building in kyiv was at risk of a Russian missile attack.
These threats should be taken seriously, but not always literally. Ukraine has repeatedly used Western missiles against Crimea and other Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, which Putin considers Russian soil, without dramatic escalation. In late 2022, Putin considered using nuclear weapons, according to Western officials; but his army was retreating in a chaotic manner. Today, however, it is at the forefront. Additionally, U.S. and European intelligence officials say they believe Putin remains determined to avoid an open military confrontation with NATO. An attack on the soil of the I’LL TAKE it would almost certainly trigger Article Five, the alliance’s mutual defense clause, one of the reasons Putin has stepped up sabotage as an alternative.
More generally, the use of Oreshnik and its like is part of a new era of missile warfare. Russia and Ukraine have used large numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against each other. In October, Iran carried out the largest ballistic missile barrage in history against Israel, around 200, its second major salvo of the year. Israel has used air-launched ballistic missiles (relatively rare and exotic weapons) against Iran. On November 17, India said it had tested its own 1,500-kilometer-range hypersonic missile.
The United States plans to deploy non-nuclear medium-range missiles in Germany in 2026. The Europeans are cooperating to build their own conventional “deep strike” systems. And countries are also investing huge sums in missile defenses to deal with all this, although there are few viable and cost-effective means of defending a particular area against very long-range missiles, which enter at a speed and angle that make them difficult to hit. intercept. Oreshnik is the first multiple-warhead intermediate-range missile to be fired in combat. It may not be the last.
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