In November, as voters in the United States elected Donald Trump to return to the White House, the Chinese president Xi Jinping participated in notable meetings in three important international forums: the summit of the BRICS in Kazan, Russia; the Leadership Forum APEC in Lima, Peru; and the summit of G-20 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Beyond the predominant role of Xi and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) In each event, Xi’s performances offer valuable clues about how the PRC is positioning itself on the international stage to maximize its strategic benefits. They also provide clues to how the PRC under Xi might respond to the challenges and opportunities posed by the new Trump administration.
China’s global involvement, reflected in its activities in the three forums, does not seek “leadership” in the traditional Western sense. Instead, the PRC pursues its own national interest while interacting with various global actors and seeking to influence and reform the international system in its favor.
On the one hand, the PRC under Xi maintains a firm and uncompromising stance toward any questioning over what it considers “internal affairs.” This includes your claim about Taiwanthe use of its army to threaten the island, the internment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiangthe repression of democracy in Hong Kong and other violations of the rights of its citizens.
Beyond these “forbidden” topics, in recent summits, Xi and the PRC have been notoriously ambiguous about the international agenda they publicly promote. This allows them to court diverse actors, simultaneously developing relationships with rivals such as Iran y Saudi Arabia, selling weapons to Russia for their invasion Ukraineand strengthening ties with European States through “shared” interests in lasting peace.
At the BRICS summit in Kazan, the PRC worked to consolidate a diverse coalition of illiberal states, united by their common interest in weakening accountability to the Western system based on rules and institutions, without overly destabilizing the institutional architectures that underpin global trade and security. Xi demonstrated indirect leadership, financially supporting the group through New Development Bankshaping their agenda through bureaucratic maneuvers and speaking in vague terms about stability and “high-quality development.”
The expansion of the bloc from 10 to 23 members increased its economic and political weight, preserving its identity as a club skeptical of the rules-based liberal international order. The summit avoided public debates on principles that could expose differences between its members and moved forward on concrete mechanisms, such as BRICS Clear and bilateral agreements for trade compensation. This strengthens China’s strategic interests by reducing its vulnerability to the dollar-dominated financial system, while deepening dependence on its partners.
At the APEC summit in Lima, Xi showed a different side of Chinese leadership, using global circumstances to expand his economic and political dominance in the Pacific. A key symbolic moment was the inauguration of the port of Chancay, controlled by the Chinese logistics company COSCOwhich reinforces China’s position in the transpacific routes and in Latin America’s access to this trade.
In addition, Xi took advantage of the summit for significant bilateral meetings. With Peruvian host Dina Boluarte he signed an updated free trade agreement and 30 memoranda of understanding. In Chile, President Gabriel Boric expressed interest in deepening trade relations with China and supported the PRC’s entry into forums such as the CPTPP and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA).
At the summit of G-20 In Rio de Janeiro, Xi used strategic ambiguity to strengthen ties with developing countries while presenting himself as a constructive partner among developed democracies. Xi highlighted China’s interest in reducing tariffs for developing nations, aligning with his Global Development Initiative.
During his state visit with the Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silvaalthough Brazil did not adhere to the Belt and Road InitiativeXi granted enhanced diplomatic status and signed 37 commitments in areas such as agriculture and digital technology. He also held bilateral meetings with European leaders and with the presidents Javier Miley from Argentina and Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico, seeking to consolidate Chinese investments and favorable strategic policies in the region.
At the BRICS, APEC, and G-20 summits, Xi Jinping effectively used strategic ambiguity to consolidate a diverse coalition of illiberal actors, expand China’s economic and political dominance in the Pacific, and maneuver between developed and developing countries. The Trump administration will need to calibrate its China policy considering the risks of this strategy and its ability to exploit perceived American isolationism.
*The author is a research professor at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the United States Army War College. The opinions expressed here are strictly his own.
