On November 18, 30 NATO ships y 4,000 military personnel they headed to Baltic Sea to carry out one of the largest naval exercises in northern Europe, hours after two communications cables were cut in that same area.
He simulacrum “Freezing Winds”which lasted 12 dayswas part of an effort to strengthen the security of NATO infrastructure in it Baltic Sea. This area, through which the 15% of world maritime trafficis seen as increasingly vulnerable to possible attacks.
He Baltic Sea this bordered by eight NATO countries y Russia. Since 2022, when Russia invaded Ukrainethere have been at least three incidents of possible sabotage of the 40 critical telecommunications cables and gas pipelines that run along its relatively shallow seabed.
“NATO is stepping up patrols, allies are investing in innovative technologies that can help better protect these assets,” said Cmdr. Arlo Abrahamsonspokesman for the Allied Maritime Command of the I’LL TAKE.
However, the ease with which a ship’s anchor can cut a cable into the seabed, coupled with the treacherous and changing sea conditions, makes effective prevention of these attacks a virtually impossible task.
On the third day of the exercise, the commander of the True German, Beata Królattempted to launch an underwater drone from its demining ship, the Weilheimwith the aim of inspecting the seabed. This occurred while an intensifying winter storm in the region.
After a 30-minute launch delay, the drone had frozen y couldn’t work. “Las batteries got cold” the commander commented, shrugging her shoulders, as she waited for the team to warm up before trying again.
Having spent years detonating World War II mines at the bottom of the Baltic Seathe I’LL TAKE is adapting its fleet six minehunting vessels to monitor also activities suspicious submarines.
These vessels now feature hull-mounted sonar to scan the seabed, drones able to take photographs and videos underwater, and specialized divers available to intervene when necessary.
However, the powers of the I’LL TAKE They still remain limited. “We are a defensive alliance, so by carrying out training and maneuvers, also in crucial areas with underwater infrastructure, we show our presence and prevent rather than actively intervene,” he declared. King.
Security sources claim that the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3, which set sail from the Russian port of Ust-Luga on November 15, was the responsible for cutting the two cables submarines in Swedish economic waters between 17 and 18 November by dragging their anchor along the seabed.
On Monday, the ship remained parked in economic waters of Denmarkunder the surveillance of warships of members of the I’LL TAKEafter Sweden request his return to subject him to an investigation. Although some politicians had accused him of sabotageno authority presented evidence confirming that his actions were intentional.
China has expressed his willingness to collaborate in researchwhile his ally Russia ha rejected any implication in the incidents that occurred in the Baltic infrastructures.
The case bears similarities to an incident that occurred last year, when the NewNew Polar Bear chino bouquet caused damage to two cables that connected Estonia con Finland y Swedenas well as in a Estonia-Finland gas pipeline.
Then, China He offered similar promises of collaboration, but the ship was not detained. A year later, the finnish researchers y estonios still have not presented conclusions about the case.
Cable damage is not a new phenomenon. According to the International Cable Protection Committee, based in the United Kingdomapproximately 150 communications cables are damaged every year worldwide.
In the case of Baltic Seatelecommunications cables, power lines and gas pipelines located in shallow water are particularly vulnerable due to heavy maritime traffic of the area, as pointed out by the American telecommunications research company TeleGeography.
If it were proven that any of the recent incidents were sabotage perpetrated by another country, this would mark the return of a type of war that has not been seen for decades.
“You would have to go back to World War I or the Spanish-American War to find state-sponsored sabotage of an undersea cable,” he said. Paul Brodskyprincipal investigator of TeleGeography.
To address this potential threat, the I’LL TAKE opened in May, in Londonits Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructures (CUI). The objective of this center is to map all critical infrastructures in NATO controlled waters and identify their possible weak points.
In Rostockon the German Baltic coast, a multinational naval headquarters was inaugurated in October to protect the interests of members of the I’LL TAKE at sea.
“What I think we can do is find who is responsible after an incident,” declared the CUI Section Head, Comandante Pal Bratbakon board the Weilheimhighlighting the growing power of technology in this type of research.
The Maritime Research and Experimentation Center of the I’LL TAKE in Italia is launching software that will combine private and military data and images from hydrophones, radars, satellites, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of ships and fibers with Distributed Acoustic Detection (DAS), which private telecommunications companies use to Locate cuts in your cables.
“If we have a good image of what is happening, we can deploy units to verify what the system tells us”declared Bratbak.
German Lieutenant General Hans-Werner Wiermann stated that no pipeline or cable can be monitored all the time. “The appropriate response to this type of hybrid attacks is resilience,” he stated.
Additionally, he noted that companies are already laying cables to add “redundancies,” that is, replacement routes that will allow critical infrastructure to continue functioning if a cable is cut.
(With information from Reuters)
